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1 Introduction 
This paper studies the effect of welfare programs on work incentives and the labor 
supply of adults in developing countries. The document builds on the experimental 
evaluations of three programs implemented in rural areas in Latin America: Mexico’s 
PROGRESA, Nicaragua’s Red de Protección Social (RPS) and Honduras’ Programa de 
Asignación Familiar (PRAF). The results exploit the random assignment of localities to 
program deployment and control groups, and present comparable estimates of impacts on 
adult labor supply and remuneration levels, derived from homogeneous datasets and 
estimation methodologies. 
The impact of welfare and income support programs on labor supply has been widely 
studied in developed countries (Moffitt, 2002; Meghir and Phillips, 2008; Moffitt and Scholz, 
2009). This literature has stressed work disincentives among recipient households, and these 
and other considerations have led recent reforms to incorporate sophisticated measures to 
mitigate these negative effects (Moffitt, 2003a; Blundell and Hoynes, 2004; Dickens, Gregg 
and Wadsworth, 2004; Michalopoulus, Robins and Card, 2005). The programs under study in 
this paper are conditional cash transfers (CCT), which combine monetary benefits with 
incentives for curbing child labor and fostering the accumulation of human capital. Benefit 
receipt is subject to a series of verifiable conditions, such as school attendance, vaccination, 
and regular medical checkups, among others. According to the results from a number of 
evaluations in Latin America, cash transfers, especially when combined with conditionalities, 
have proved successful in increasing welfare and human capital accumulation in recipient 
households, and in lowering child labor (see the reviews by Rawlings and Rubio, 2003; 
2005).  
Unlike their recent counterparts in the United States and Europe, however, these 
programs do not incorporate safeguards for their potential impact on the labor supply of 
adults. Moreover, there is only limited consistent systematic evidence on this aspect, despite a 
wealth of empirical analysis on their intended outcomes. This study attempts to establish 
whether there are any incentive effects of the cash transfers on the labor supply of adults in 
recipient households, on non-eligible individuals, and on the broader labor market 
equilibrium. 
The main contribution of this paper is the systematic and well-identified evidence on 
the labor supply effects of welfare programs in developing countries. Despite its crucial role 
in the income generation process of the poor, there is limited evidence on labor supply 
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decisions in developing countries. Existing studies indicate the presence of complex 
interactions between public policy, work incentives and labor allocation within households 
(see for instance Ardington, Case and Hosegood, 2009). Moreover, the systematic evidence 
presented below is derived from experimental evaluation designs,
1
 which have clear 
advantages over the policy and natural experiments underlying most of previous studies of 
welfare programs and labor outcomes (Angrist and Krueger, 1999; Blundell and MaCurdy, 
1999; Imbens et al., 2001; Eissa et al., 2008). These evaluation strategies have also overcome 
some of the shortcomings of previous randomized experiments, such as those of the Negative 
Income Tax of the 1960s and 1970s in the United States (Ashenfelter and Plant, 1990; 
Moffitt, 2003b). 
Comparable results for the three countries indicate mostly negative but small and non-
significant effects of the programs on the employment of adults, no reallocation of labor 
between agricultural and other sectors, and a reduction in hours worked by adults in eligible 
households in RPS. Moreover, PROGRESA had a positive effect on beneficiaries’ wages. 
The results indicate that the programs did not imply a major disincentive to work despite 
substantial transfers of up to 40 percent of household consumption, but they did have some 
effects on local labor markets. These findings are related to the evidence on the indirect 
impact of PROGRESA on the consumption of ineligible households (Angelucci and Di 
Giorgio, 2009), and imply that indirect and equilibrium effects should be accounted for in 
program design, and when assessing the programs’ effects on other outcomes. These 
equilibrium effects also have important consequences for the interpretation of results from 
randomized controlled trials (see Moffitt, 2003b; Duflo et al., 2007; Heckman, 2008; and the 
debate between Deaton, 2009, and Imbens, 2009). 
The document is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the theoretical 
underpinnings of the potential impact of cash transfers on labor supply, and presents a review 
of the empirical evidence for countries in Latin America. Section 3 briefly reviews the 
programs and their evaluation strategies, and describes the estimation and inference 
procedures. Section 4 presents the empirical results on labor market outcomes for adults in 
the three programs. Conclusions follow. 
                                                 
1
 Behrman and Todd (1999), Skoufias et al. (1999) and Skoufias and Parker (2001) and Gertler (2004), among 
others, describe the original and well-executed experimental evaluation strategy of Mexico’s PROGRESA, on 
which the evaluations of RPS and PRAF were based. 
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2 Labor markets and conditional cash transfer programs  
2.1 Potential impact of CCTs on labor markets 
CCT programs combine short term poverty alleviation (through cash transfers) with 
long term objectives through incentives to human capital accumulation (school attendance, 
health check-ups, improved nutrition, and reduction of child labor).
2
 With the exception of 
minor training components in some programs, the overall design for CCTs in Latin America 
is not directly related to employment of adults in beneficiary households. There are no 
restrictions on work, and unlike previous workfare-like initiatives in developing countries, 
CCTs do not use low wage jobs as targeting mechanisms (Besley and Coate, 1992; Kanbur et 
al., 1994). Most importantly, earned labor income does not reduce benefit levels. In this 
sense, CCTs constitute a simpler policy instrument than welfare programs in developed 
countries: as a pure subsidy, CCTs do not induce steep replacement rates like traditional 
welfare programs, nor the complexity of welfare-to-work initiatives such as the US’ Earned 
Income Tax Credit (Eissa and Liebman, 1996) or the UK’s Working Family’s Tax Credit 
(Meghir and Phillips, 2008).
3
 
The lack of work requirements does not mean, however, that the programs are neutral 
in terms of adult labor supply and work incentives. The income support component and the 
conditionalities on children’s health and education might still have affected these outcomes. 
Economic theory suggests several ways in which CCTs can affect work decisions within 
recipient households. In a standard static model of choice between consumption and leisure, 
the components of CCTs might play a role through at least four channels.  
Firstly, the cash transfer component of the program constitutes an increase in 
unearned non labor income. As such, it induces a pure income effect, which loosens the 
budget constraint of the recipient households. The rise in unearned income might reduce 
hours of work if leisure is normal for beneficiaries, but the presence of fixed hour or money 
costs, such as commuting or childcare (Cogan, 1981; Bhattarai and Whalley, 2003) implies 
that a lump-sum transfer might increase labor supply. 
Conditionalities constitute the second channel through which CCTs might induce 
behavioral responses in the labor supply of adults. The requirements related to children’s 
                                                 
2
 Section 3.1 and the appendix describe the three programs under study in more detail. 
3
 Moreover, program overlap is less of a problem for program evaluation (Moffitt, 2002) in the cases under 
study: PROGRESA unified several disparate programs in Mexico, while PRAF and RPS represented some of 
the first attempts of widespread income support in Honduras and Nicaragua. 
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human capital accumulation might have an impact on the household’s allocation of time: the 
positive impact of CCTs on children’s school attendance might free time previously spent on 
childcare (Baker, Gruber and Milligan, 2008), further reducing the cost of work. 
The third channel is related to the potential fall in household income due to the 
reduction in child labor. This effect reduces the net impact of cash transfers in households 
where children are induced to reduce their participation in work activities. This might result 
in a net reduction in total household income, and thus mitigate the transfer’s potential 
disincentive for the labor supply of adults.
4
 
Finally, the fourth channel operates through indirect and equilibrium effects. On the 
one hand, there might be indirect effects – Angelucci and Di Giorgio (2009), for instance, 
find impacts of PROGRESA on the consumption of ineligible households. On the other hand, 
changes in the labor supply schedule of beneficiaries might affect aggregate wage levels and 
thus remunerations for recipients and non-recipients. In the presence of such effects, the 
identification strategy based on the random allocation of the program would be partially 
compromised, because of a violation of the stable unit treatment value assumption (Angrist et 
al., 1996). In terms of labor supply, equilibrium effects reduce the scope for the interpretation 
of reduced form estimates as simple labor supply elasticities with respect to unearned income. 
The combination of these four channels implies that the overall effect of CCTs on 
labor market outcomes for adults is ambiguous from a theoretical point of view. The presence 
of any impact, and its direction, is ultimately an empirical question.  
 
2.2 The impact of CCTs on labor markets: previous findings for 
Latin America 
Most of the literature evaluating the impact of CCTs focuses on the program’s 
intended outcomes. While results vary from country to country, program evaluations show to 
some degree a positive effect on years of schooling, reductions in child labor and 
improvement in some key health indicators (Rawlings and Rubio 2003, 2005; Bouillon and 
Tejerina, 2006).
 
The labor supply of adults has been partially analysed for PROGRESA and RPS 
(there does not seem to be any published study for PRAF). The significant reduction in child 
labor for PROGRESA (Skoufias and Parker, 2001) contrasts with the lack of impact on labor 
                                                 
4
 Moreover, Ardington et al.’s (2009) results on migration from South Africa indicate that transfers might affect 
even more complex within-household interactions, inducing unexpected labor supply responses. 
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market outcomes for adults in beneficiary households, according to results from Parker and 
Skoufias (2000) and Skoufias and Di Maro (2008) obtained from probit estimations. Both 
studies find no significant effects of the program on adult labor force participation within 
eligible households in program localities. Also in the context of PROGRESA, Angelucci and 
Di Giorgi (2009) find that household equivalent labor earnings for adults are not affected by 
the program. None of these three studies, however, exploit fully the longitudinal nature of the 
evaluation strategy, since they do not include fixed effects at the household or individual 
levels.  
The impact of Nicaragua’s Red de Protección Social (RPS) on the labor supply of 
adults is analyzed in detail by Maluccio (2007). While the studies of PROGRESA in the 
previous paragraph concentrated on individual labor force participation and household 
earnings, Maluccio (2007) studies the effect of RPS on total hours of work at the household 
level. The results, obtained by means of a random effects model, indicate a small but 
significant negative effect of the program on total household hours of work, with most of the 
negative impact on time spent in agricultural activities.  
The discussion and results in the following pages overcomes the individual and 
combined limitations of these previous studies. The analysis below provides comparable 
results for the three programs. They are based on a common procedure for processing the 
original datasets, which leads to homogeneous definitions for dependent and independent 
variables. Moreover, the estimates for the three programs are derived from the same 
methodology, which takes advantage of the longitudinal and experimental nature of the 
evaluations by including individual and household fixed effects. Finally, while evaluations of 
PROGRESA concentrated on individual participation and those of RPS on household hours, 
the results below allow for further disaggregation, studying participation, hours of work, 
sector allocation and wages (when possible) for all programs. 
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3 Experimental evaluation strategies and estimation 
methodology 
3.1 The programs and their evaluations 
The data used in this document corresponds to ad hoc longitudinal surveys carried out 
to evaluate each specific program. The three programs shared a common evaluation 
methodology, which implied baseline and follow up data collection in localities randomly 
assigned to initial program deployment and in those assigned to the control groups. The three 
data sources were harmonized following common criteria to achieve maximum 
comparability, using the methodology described in CEDLAS (2009). 
The three interventions targeted rural areas in poor regions of the respective countries. 
The following paragraphs briefly describe the three programs’ evaluation strategies,5 which 
were based on PROGRESA’s original experimental design which randomized program 
deployment at the locality level, creating treatment and control groups.  
In 1997, Mexico began implementing the first phase of PROGRESA. It was 
geographically targeted by locality, based on a poverty index. From an initial group of 506 
localities selected for the first round, 320 were randomly selected to participate in the 
PROGRESA program (i.e., qualifying households in those localities would be eligible to 
participate), while the program was not deployed in the remaining 186 localities. Households 
in the latter localities were still subject to the data collection process, and thus constituted the 
control group for the program’s evaluation. 
The data employed in this study originates in the PROGRESA Evaluation Survey 
ENCEL. The estimates below are based on the initial baseline survey, and three follow-up 
rounds
6
 implemented in the subsequent semesters after the program implementation. The 
surveys collected socio-demographic and labor market information at the household and 
individual levels for all households in both treatment and control communities.  
Honduras’ PRAF was implemented in a set of 50 randomly selected municipalities of 
a total of 70, with the 20 additional municipalities forming the control group. The data in this 
document corresponds to a baseline survey carried out in the last quarter of 2000 and a 
                                                 
5
 The structure of each program is detailed in the appendix at the end of the paper. Further references may also 
be found in Todd (2004) for PROGRESA, Glewwe and Olinto (2004) for PRAF, and Maluccio and Flores 
(2005) for RPS.  
6
 Baseline data was gathered between November 1997 and March 1998. The first, second and third follow ups 
correspond to November 1998, March 1999 and November 1999 respectively. 
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follow-up survey in 2002. In contrast to the case of PROGRESA, where all households in 
treatment and control localities were interviewed, the PRAF surveys covered a sample of 
households. The corresponding sampling weights are used in the empirical work below. 
For the case of Nicaragua’s RPS, half of the poorest 42 localities were randomly 
assigned to the treatment group. The data used in this document corresponds to the initial 
baseline survey carried out in the third quarter of 2000, and the first follow-up survey 
conducted in 2001. As with the PRAF evaluation data, the survey consists of a sample of the 
targeted population, and sampling weights are used for the estimations. 
Finally, despite the common characteristics, it should be noted that there were 
important differences in the average size of cash transfer by program. Imputing transfers from 
each program’s eligibility rules to the evaluation samples used in this paper, the transfers 
represented about 4 percent of total household consumption for PRAF, 20 percent for RPS 
and 40 percent for PROGRESA.
7
 The potential effect of these differences is discussed in the 
empirical results section. 
  
3.2 Estimation and inference with random assignment by village 
The random assignment of localities in the context of the three programs under study 
and the availability of repeated observations implies that a differences-in-differences (DD) is 
the best suited estimation technique to exploit the evaluation design and identify the causal 
effects of the programs. A standard DD model with controls takes the form: 
ist s t ist st istY A B cX I        (1) 
where istY  denotes the outcome variable of interest for individual (or household) i in group 
(or village) s at time t, stI  is an indicator variable representing treatment status for group s in 
time t (or alternatively, an interaction between a treatment group indicator and time effects), 
As and Bt are group and time effects, respectively, Xist is a matrix of individual characteristics 
and ist  is an error term. The estimate of the program impact is the coefficient  . Without 
the Xist controls and with two time periods, the estimate of   by ordinary least squares (OLS) 
is simply the difference in mean outcomes between the treatment and control groups in the 
                                                 
7
 These estimates are roughly in line with others in the literature: Maluccio (2004) reports 4 percent for PRAF, 
18 percent for RPS and 20 percent for PROGRESA, although for the latter Gertler (2004) computes the average 
transfer as one third of total household income. 
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two time periods. The more general case, with more than two time periods, adds a full set of 
time controls and interactions to account for differential evolutions over time. 
The canonical DD model of equation 1 is based on repeated observations of groups 
over time, and without including individual controls Xist, the estimate of   amounts to 
differences in the outcomes at the locality level. The evaluation of PROGRESA, PRAF and 
RPS, however, collected repeated household and individual observations, which implies that 
a much richer set of information is available and should be exploited (Wooldridge, 2001, 
2007). Specifically, the inclusion of individual (or household) fixed effects in the estimation 
of equation 1 allows the identification of program effects at the individual level, rather than at 
locality aggregates. While these individual fixed effects were not accounted for in the studies 
of labor supply reviewed in the previous section, they are routinely included in evaluations of 
CCT’s impacts on other outcomes (for instance, in Gertler’s 2004 evaluation of 
PROGRESA’s effect on health, among many others). The results below present two sets of 
estimates for each outcome based on equation 1: with a full set of individual controls Xist, and 
with a full set of individual fixed effects and no Xist variables. 
With respect to the estimation methodology, the empirical results presented below are 
based on linear models – either OLS or fixed effects estimations of equation 1 – for binary 
dependent variables such as labor force participation and for continuous variables such as 
hours of work, wages and income. As pointed out by Angrist and Pischke (2008), linear 
probability model estimates do not differ substantially from those of probit or logit 
regressions. Moreover, coefficients on the indicator and interaction variables in equation 1 
have a straightforward causal interpretation for linear estimates. 
All the results below report estimates of   in equation 1 over the full treatment and 
control samples, which correspond to intention to treat (ITT) coefficients. In the case of 
PROGRESA, the dataset contains a multidimensional targeting score and thus the eligibility 
status of each household. For this reason, PROGRESA’s results are also computed as 
differences between eligible households in treatment and control localities (average treatment 
effect – ATE),8 and differences between ineligible households between the two sets of 
localities. The latter estimates correspond to Angelucci and Di Giorgio’s (2009) indirect 
treatment effects (ITE). To account for some heterogeneous effects of the programs, the 
estimations are also computed by conditioning on the gender of the individual or the 
                                                 
8
 Since take up was very high among eligible households, average treatment effects and average treatment 
effects on the treated are roughly equivalent (Angelucci and Di Giorgio, 2009). For simplicity, the ATE 
terminology is adopted in the description of the results.  
 11 
household head, as an alternative to the inclusion of multiple interactions (Djebbari and 
Smith, 2008). 
Finally, the standard errors in the estimations need to account for the structure of the 
program evaluation and implementation process. In the context of the three CCTs under 
study, the random assignment process did not apply directly over beneficiary households or 
individuals. The allocation was instead done at the geographical level. In terms of the 
equation above, randomization occurs at group (village) level (s) instead of individual or 
household level (i). Since the eligibility for the program is defined at the group level, the 
standard errors of the DD estimates should account for the likely intra-cluster correlation to 
avoid a potential bias. Donald and Lang (2007) attribute this bias to the fact that many of the 
outcomes analyzed in the literature are serially correlated, which is not usually controlled for 
in DD estimation – see also the discussion in Bertrand, Duflo and Mullainathan (2004 – 
BDM henceforth). This issue might be particularly predominant in the case of the labor 
market outcomes covered in this study. Not accounting for this correlation across the 
randomization groups makes the usual OLS standard errors inconsistent, and leads to 
erroneous inferences of the program’s causal effects.  
BDM propose two methods to correct the standard errors of estimates in equation 1:
9
 
(i) taking into account serial correlation of the outcome variable in each group s; this is 
known as cluster-robust variance estimation (CRVE) and is implemented by clustering 
observations by the assignment groups (e.g., localities); and (ii) estimating standard errors 
using block bootstrap with replacement.
10
 The two methods are implemented in the empirical 
results presented below. However, while BDM report uncorrected OLS standard errors for 
block bootstraps, the results below are based on Cameron, Gelbach and Miller’s (2008) 
suggestion of reporting bootstrapped CRVE-corrected standard errors.  
These corrections to the covariance matrix yield unbiased estimates of household or 
individual level outcomes in geographic targeting settings, accounting for potential serial 
correlation across groups. As a robustness check, all the estimates presented below include 
the two versions of the standard errors.  
 
                                                 
9
 BDM also propose a third correction, by aggregating the data into group-year cells and estimating this model. 
However, only results from individual-level data are reported below. 
10
 While in standard bootstrap methods individual observations are randomly selected with replacement from the 
original sample, in block bootstrap a series of consecutive observations are selected instead. In the context of 
program evaluation with random assignment at the geographical level, the blocks correspond to the geographical 
units over which the treatment was allocated. 
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4 CCTs and labor market outcomes for adults 
4.1 Descriptive statistics and the random assignment processes 
This section presents the estimates of the effect of CCT programs on labor outcomes 
of adults using experimental evaluation data from three interventions: PRAF (Honduras), 
PROGRESA (Mexico), and RPS (Nicaragua).  
Table 1 presents a series of descriptive statistics at the time of the baseline survey for 
both treatment and control localities for these three programs. These statistics allow to verify 
the comparability of the treatment and control groups in terms of observables, and to 
establish whether it is necessary to control for pre-program differences when estimating 
program effects. 
As expected in a rural setting in developing countries, household size in all three 
programs is fairly large, with an average of more than six individuals per household. About 
70 to 80 percent of these households include two spouses. The calculations in the tables show 
that treatment and control households are not significantly different in their demographic 
composition, with a few exceptions for some subgroups.  
Table 1 also presents educational levels for treatment and control localities in each 
program. Enrolment rates are above 60 percent for children aged 6-11 in the three programs, 
with slightly higher rates when both parents are present in the household. Since the programs 
are targeted at poor areas in each country, the distribution of educational outcomes is 
concentrated on lower levels of attainment. The differences in educational achievement and 
enrollment rates between the treatment and control groups are small. 
Finally, regarding labor market outcomes, the program datasets only allow for a 
simple definition of participation – individuals report if they work or if they do not. 
Employment varies from 52.2 (PROGRESA) to 67.9 (PRAF), and it is much higher for men 
than for women (about 35 percent in PRAF, 60 percent in PROGRESA and 22 percent in 
RPS). Employment is also higher in households with children, and in single-headed 
households.  
The unconditional means of socio-economic and demographic statistics indicate some 
pre-program differences between treatment and control groups at the individual and 
household level.
11
 These results are in general agreement with preexisting reports on these 
                                                 
11
 The same is apparent in a conditional framework, as discussed in the appendix on the analysis of the random 
assignment process, which indicates that the resulting have some significant differences in some dimensions for 
the three programs. 
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programs, which also find some significant differences among treatment and control localities 
(see Behrman and Todd, 1999, for PROGRESA, Glewwe and Olinto, 2004 for PRAF, and 
Maluccio and Flores, 2005, for RPS). Given the random assignment process in the three 
programs, it is likely that these differences arise because of the small number of effectively 
randomized units (localities). By virtue of the randomization processes, these differences 
reflect the composition of the resulting samples rather than selection into treatment. The 
estimations below control for individual characteristics or individual fixed effects to account 
for the ex post differences in the treatment and control samples. 
 
4.2 The effect of CCTs on labor market outcomes for adults 
This section presents an analysis of labor market outcomes for adults in PRAF, 
PROGRESA and RPS. All estimates for individuals refer to those between 15 and 80 years 
old, while for household outcomes the sample is restricted to household heads in the same 
age range. 
Since the evaluation focused primarily on the programs’ intended outcomes, such as 
children’s health and education, the household surveys only have a reduced set of labor 
market indicators when compared to larger periodic surveys. In the three data sources 
employed in this study, the adult population can be partitioned into two alternate states, either 
as working or as not working – it is thus not possible to distinguish between inactivity and 
unemployment.
12
 The discussion that follows refers to working, employment rates and labor 
supply interchangeably. 
The outcomes of interest correspond to the following variables: an indicator of 
whether the individual is employed; the number of hours worked in all occupations in a week 
(for those with positive hours); an indicator for employment in agricultural activities (for 
those employed); and the total hours worked in the household by members aged 15 to 80 
years old (this variable is computed and estimated at the household level, for households with 
positive hours). 
As stated in the previous section, the results correspond to two alternative 
specifications for each outcome of interest. On the one hand, the tables report OLS estimates 
  in equation 1 with a series of controls: 
                                                 
12
 It is possible to make this distinction for RPS, but to maintain comparable results the results below report 
those for the same variable for the three programs. 
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 Controls for individual characteristics: gender (if applicable), household size, an indicator 
for bi-parental household, number of children, age of the individual, age squared, and 
educational indicators (complete primary through complete college). 
 Controls for household characteristics: the gender of the household head (if applicable), 
household size, an indicator for bi-parental household, number of children of the head of 
household, a dummy variable indicating if at least one child in the household attends 
school, and indicators for the household head’s educational level. 
The fixed effect estimations, on the other hand, do not include any individual controls, 
since most of those listed above are time invariant or have low variability. All estimations 
include time effects, treatment indicators, interactions between the two, and locality controls. 
As described in the previous section, the results also report cluster-robust standard errors and 
cluster-robust standard errors by block-bootstrap at the locality level with 300 replications. 
Finally, the results present estimates for the intention to treat (ITT) for the three programs and 
for males and females separately. For the specific case of PROGRESA, the availability of 
eligibility status implies that average treatment effects (ATE) and indirect treatment effects 
(ITE) can also be computed. The tables only report the relevant coefficient for the treatment 
effects (the coefficient  ).13 
The estimates for PRAF correspond to the simple two-period case (baseline in second 
half of 2000, follow up in May-August 2002), while estimates for RPS and PROGRESA 
include multiple consecutive follow up surveys.
14
 RPS’ baseline was carried out in August-
September 2000, with a first follow up in October 2001 and a second one in October 2002. 
For PROGRESA, the baseline corresponds to September 1997-March 1998, and the follow 
up data was collected in November 1998, March 1999 and November 1999.  
Tables 2 and 3 report the main results for the employment status of adults in the three 
programs. The columns show the estimated coefficient of the time-treatment indicator in the 
regression, with the two alternative estimates of the standard errors (cluster-adjusted and 
block-bootstrapped).  
Table 2 presents the results for Honduras’s PRAF and Nicaragua’s RPS. The 
estimates of the programs’ effects on employment are mostly negative, ranging from -0.5 to -
1.8 percentage points for PRAF, and from -0.2 to -2.3 percentage points for RPS (with 
                                                 
13
 Full regression outputs for all estimations are available from the authors upon request. 
14
 The tables report the effect by round of the evaluation survey, and correspond to the difference between the 
round and the baseline (pre-program) levels. These effects are estimated jointly by multiple time and treatment 
interactions, and not as separate regressions by follow up period.  
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positive effects for males in the first follow up survey), and the effects are higher in absolute 
value for females than for males. None of these estimates, however, are different from zero at 
standard significance levels.  
Table 3 presents the results from Mexico’s PROGRESA. The coefficients on 
employment estimated jointly for males and females are also negative, and in the same range 
as those reported in Table 2 (from about -0.1 to -2.6 percentage points). However, none of 
them appear to be consistently significant for all three follow up periods or for both OLS and 
FE estimations. The exception is the case of ITE (estimates for individuals in ineligible 
households) corresponding to the third follow up survey, which seems to be driven mostly by 
a fairly large fall (about 3.5-5.1 percentage points) in employment among ineligible females 
in the third follow up survey. The inconsistency of this result for other time periods implies 
that this is probably a statistical artifact. 
Occupational choice is another labor market outcome that might be affected by CCTs 
and related programs. For instance, Skoufias et al. (2008) find that the PAAL program in 
Mexico induced workers to move away from agricultural work, supporting the idea that such 
work acts as food insurance. For this purpose, the regressions in Tables 4 and 5 present the 
results for regressions where the dependent variable is an indicator for employed individuals 
equal to one if they work in agricultural occupations, and zero otherwise.  
The coefficients reported in Tables 4 and 5 indicate that none of the three programs 
had statistically significant effects on labor allocation to agricultural or other sectors. The 
results do not indicate a clear pattern across time or estimations methodologies either, so the 
lack of significance is probably not due to lack of statistical power. 
This emerging pattern of non-significant effects of the programs on labor market 
outcomes for adults is confirmed by the results presented in Tables 6 and 7, in which the 
dependent variable is the number of hours worked (for individuals with strictly positive 
reported hours). The estimates for PRAF are consistently positive and small (from about 0.5 
to about 1.85 hours per week), while those for RPS are consistently negative (from about -1.5 
to about -5.7), and higher in absolute value for women (-3 to -5.6 depending on the follow up 
and estimation method). The results for PROGRESA in Table 7 do not indicate a clear 
pattern. Taken together, the evidence indicates that there are no significant effects on 
individual hours of work for any of the programs.  
Tables 8 and 9 present the impact of the programs on total hours of work by adults in 
a household (these are household, not individual estimates). The results for PRAF in Table 8 
are similar to those in Table 6, with positive but non-significant effects on hours, especially 
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in female-headed households. The results for RPS, however, exhibit a clear and significant 
pattern: hours of work fell significantly, by about 4.7-6.3 hours by the time of the second 
follow up survey (a year after the baseline), and this result is driven mainly by a large and 
strongly significant fall in hours worked by adults in female headed households (14.8-16 
weekly hours). These results are compatible with Maluccio’s (2007) findings for RPS, based 
on random effects estimation. Finally, the results for PROGRESA in Table 9 indicate small 
and not statistically significant results on this household aggregate.  
Summing up, none of the three CCT programs exhibited major impacts on labor 
market outcomes for adults. Employment levels and the sectoral allocation of work among 
those working were not fundamentally transformed by either of the programs. The most 
notable result was a reduction of hours of work at the household level for RPS, especially in 
female headed households. While average benefits were substantial in RPS and small in 
PRAF (with respect to household consumption levels), they were even larger in PROGRESA, 
suggesting that subsidy levels were not necessarily the main factor at work. The overall 
results indicate that program effects operate, if anything, through adjustments in the intensive 
(hours) rather than the extensive (participation) margin. However, the analysis of 
employment and hours in the labor market is necessarily partial, since program effects might 
be manifested through prices rather than quantities. The following section studies the effect 
of PROGRESA on wages and labor income (this information was not collected by the PRAF 
and RPS evaluation surveys). 
 
4.3 The effect of PROGRESA on wages and labor income 
Tables 10 and 11 present the effects of PROGRESA
15
 on individual hourly wages 
(available only for the first and third follow up) and household labor income per adult.  
Table 10 indicates that PROGRESA had a sizeable effect on eligible individuals, 
increasing hourly wages by about 5-7 percent – these results are significant at the 5 and 10 
percent levels for FE estimations (ATE and ITT, respectively), with similar OLS coefficients 
and standard errors. Moreover, these results seem to be driven fundamentally by males – 
none of the coefficients for females are significant, and neither are any of the indirect 
treatment effect estimates. 
                                                 
15
 The PRAF and RPS evaluation surveys did not include questions on earnings or wages. 
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Finally, these higher hourly wages are also reflected in higher levels of household 
labor income for adult, since hours of work were mostly unchanged by PROGRESA. This 
effect is reported in Table 11, which indicates an increase of about 5.3 to 7.4 percent, 
concentrated in the third round of the follow up (a year after the baseline) and among male 
headed households. These results contrast with those in Angelucci and Di Giorgio’s (2009, 
Table 5), who report no significant effect of PROGRESA on monthly adult equivalent labor 
earnings. The estimates presented here, however, include individual controls (for OLS 
regressions) and individual fixed effects (for FE regressions), whereas Angelucci and Di 
Giorgio (2009) only include locality fixed effects. The results in Tables 10 and 11 are thus 
closer to estimates of changes in labor market outcomes at the individual level, rather than at 
the locality level. 
Even with no discernible impact on labor force participation or hours of work, 
PROGRESA had an effect on local labor markets by increasing the wage and labor income of 
males in eligible households. 
 
5 Conclusions 
This paper studied the effect of welfare programs on work incentives and the labor 
supply of adults in developing countries. The estimates built on the experimental evaluations 
of three programs implemented in rural areas: Mexico’s PROGRESA, Nicaragua’s Red de 
Protección Social (RPS) and Honduras’ Programa de Asignación Familiar (PRAF).  
The empirical results indicate that none of the three programs induced a major shift in 
the labor force participation of adults. However, the analysis uncovered a significant 
reduction in hours worked among adults in Nicaragua’s RPS, and a positive and significant 
effect of Mexico’s PROGRESA on wages for males in eligible households. These two 
programs had relatively high benefit levels. There were no significant impacts on labor 
market outcomes in the case of Honduras’ PRAF, which had low levels of monetary 
transfers.  
This evidence suggests that while CCT programs in poor rural areas with high benefit 
levels do not imply a substantial disincentive to work, they might still affect equilibrium in 
the labor market. Equilibrium effects in this context should not be surprising: for instance, in 
PROGRESA’s original implementation about half of the households in treatment localities 
received a transfer equivalent to 40 percent of their income. The aggregate effect of such 
large and widespread transfers had an impact at the community level beyond eligible 
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households, as reflected in Angelucci and Di Giorgio’s (2009) results on the consumption of 
ineligible households. 
These results have important implications for evaluation design and for the 
deployment and extension of the program. For impact evaluation, equilibrium effects 
complicate the interpretation of reduced form estimates from randomized controlled 
experiments, which is an old discussion in the analysis of welfare programs – see Browning’s 
(1971) critique of Orcutt and Orcutt’s (1968) randomized negative income tax experiments 
based on feedback effects of wages. In terms of the empirical results presented here, the 
programs’ impacts can be attributed to shifts in the labor supply of adults in eligible 
households, but it is not possible to rule out further effects through program-induced 
aggregate changes in labor demand. Moreover, in the case of CCTs with intended outcomes 
in multiple dimensions, indirect effects on labor market outcomes might be confounded with 
the direct impact of the transfers and the conditionalities. 
The results do not necessarily imply that work disincentives should not be accounted 
for in the design of welfare programs in developing countries. While not overly relevant in 
the three cases analyzed in this paper, the external validity of these results does not 
necessarily extend to interventions in other contexts, or to the extension of existing CCTs to 
urban areas.  
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Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics by program 
Treatment Control Treatment Control Treatment Control
Households
   All 34,455 29,538 14,856 9,221 5,781 4,203
   Eligible (%) 52.8 50.8
   Spouse present (%) 77.4 73.9 81.9 82.3 81.4 79.4
(1.06) (1.10) (0.32) (0.40) (1.37) (1.46)
   Mean household size 6.6 6.6 6.5 6.5 7.5 7.5
(0.03) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.05) (0.05)
   Mean number of children 3.4 3.2 3.3 3.2 3.3 3.3
(0.03) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.04) (0.03)
Individuals
Years of Education
   All 3.4 2.9 5.2 5.1 2.3 2.2
(0.05) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.05)
   Females 3.4 2.7 5.1 5.1 2.3 2.3
(0.07) (0.06) (0.02) (0.03) (0.07) (0.07)
   Males 3.4 3.1 5.2 5.1 2.2 2.1
(0.06) (0.06) (0.02) (0.03) (0.07) (0.07)
Employment
   All 66.3 64.5 53.1 51.2 56.2 57.7
(0.78) (0.76) (0.24) (0.30) (0.98) (1.00)
   Females 34.4 32.3 19.5 16.8 20.4 23.2
(1.22) (1.13) (0.27) (0.31) (1.15) (1.22)
   Males 90.0 88.3 86.4 85.7 90.5 91.7
(0.64) (0.67) (0.23) (0.30) (0.81) (0.79)
   Households with spouse 66.0 65.3 52.4 50.8 56.0 57.1
(0.87) (0.85) (0.26) (0.32) (1.07) (1.10)
   Households without spouse 67.4 61.3 57.4 53.5 57.0 60.5
(1.77) (1.64) (0.62) (0.79) (2.54) (2.42)
   Households with children 67.2 66.1 53.2 51.6 56.8 58.4
(0.87) (0.86) (0.27) (0.34) (1.11) (1.13)
   Households without children 62.9 59.3 52.8 49.9 53.8 55.3
(1.75) (1.59) (0.49) (0.61) (2.13) (2.19)
Agricultural Workers
   All 65.3 64.4 76.9 74.7 83.7 80.9
(0.98) (0.95) (0.35) (0.44) (0.98) (1.06)
   Females 33.0 33.8 41.8 32.7 57.2 42.2
(2.32) (2.02) (1.09) (1.28) (3.25) (3.11)
   Males 74.5 72.7 82.6 81.3 89.2 90.5
(0.99) (0.99) (0.34) (0.42) (0.90) (0.88)
Mean hours of work
   All 38.2 37.7 43.4 43.7 39.4 38.0
(0.21) (0.20) (0.10) (0.12) (0.42) (0.44)
   Females 33.0 32.4 41.5 42.3 33.1 31.2
(0.69) (0.59) (0.28) (0.39) (1.28) (1.17)
   Males 39.6 39.1 43.8 44.0 41.0 40.2
(0.19) (0.19) (0.10) (0.12) (0.40) (0.43)
PRAF (Baseline: Aug.-Dec. 2000) RPS (Baseline: Aug.-Sept. 2000)PROGRESA (Baseline: Sept. 97-Mar. 98)
 
Source: Own calculations on Program Evaluation Surveys 
Standard Errors in Parentheses 
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Table 2  
Program effects on employment, PRAF & RPS 
PRAF OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE
Baseline: Aug-Dec. 2000
t=1 (May-Aug. 2002) -0.011 -0.015 -0.005 -0.012 -0.010 -0.018
Clustered (0.016) (0.015) (0.017) (0.018) (0.023) (0.028)
Boostrapped (0.017) (0.015) (0.018) (0.019) (0.023) (0.031)
Observations 12,833 12,482 7,145 6,930 5,688 5,552
Groups 7,484 3,918 3,569
RPS
Baseline: Aug-Sept. 2000
t=1 (Oct. 2001) -0.005 -0.002 0.009 0.006 -0.022 -0.010
Clustered (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.030) (0.029)
Boostrapped (0.020) (0.021) (0.020) (0.020) (0.030) (0.028)
t=2 (Oct. 2002) -0.012 -0.013 -0.009 -0.005 -0.020 -0.023
Clustered (0.018) (0.019) (0.014) (0.014) (0.030) (0.031)
Boostrapped (0.018) (0.020) (0.015) (0.014) (0.031) (0.032)
Observations 11,241 11,287 5,828 5,852 5,413 5,435
Groups 4,426 2,300 2,126
DD Estimates
ITT ITT Males ITT Females
 
Source: Own calculations based on program evaluation surveys 
Standard errors in parentheses.  
Bootstrapped errors obtained by CRVE-Block Bootstrap with 300 replications.  
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 3 
Program effect on employment, PROGRESA 
PROGRESA
Baseline: Sept. 97-Mar. 98 OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE
t=1 (Nov. 98) -0.007 -0.008 -0.003 -0.003 -0.014 -0.015 -0.004 -0.001 -0.009 -0.008 0.004 0.003 -0.004 0.003 -0.012 -0.014 -0.019 -0.020
Clustered (0.008) (0.008) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009)* (0.009) (0.008) (0.015) (0.013) (0.012) (0.010) (0.019) (0.016) (0.011) (0.011) (0.017) (0.017)
Boostrapped (0.008) (0.007) (0.011) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009)* (0.008) (0.007) (0.016) (0.014) (0.012) (0.010) (0.019) (0.016) (0.011) (0.010) (0.018) (0.017)
t=2 (Mar. 99) -0.014 -0.009 -0.012 -0.009 -0.026 -0.014 -0.003 0.004 -0.021 -0.021 -0.002 -0.001 -0.015 -0.019 -0.005 -0.005 -0.044 -0.024
Clustered (0.007)** (0.007) (0.009) (0.009) (0.011)** (0.010) (0.009) (0.007) (0.015) (0.012)* (0.011) (0.009) (0.017) (0.015) (0.014) (0.012) (0.021)** (0.018)
Boostrapped (0.007)** (0.006) (0.009) (0.009) (0.011)** (0.010) (0.009) (0.007) (0.017) (0.012)* (0.011) (0.009) (0.017) (0.015) (0.015) (0.012) (0.022)** (0.018)
t=3 (Nov. 99) -0.009 -0.006 -0.006 -0.005 -0.021 -0.016 0.004 0.001 -0.020 -0.012 0.006 0.000 -0.010 -0.007 -0.001 -0.006 -0.051 -0.035
Clustered (0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.009) (0.011)** (0.010)* (0.008) (0.006) (0.015) (0.013) (0.011) (0.008) (0.017) (0.016) (0.012) (0.012) (0.020)** (0.019)*
Boostrapped (0.007) (0.007) (0.010) (0.009) (0.011)** (0.010)* (0.008) (0.006) (0.015) (0.014) (0.011) (0.008) (0.017) (0.017) (0.013) (0.011) (0.020)*** (0.019)*
Observations 227,619 232,725 141,272 143,347 84,051 87,044 114,582 114,967 113,037 113,457 70,881 71,085 70,391 70,626 42,565 42,724 41,486 41,655
Groups 72,933 50,636 34,344 61,231 60,666 40,671 40,339 26,430 26,152
DD Estimates
ITT ATE ITE ITT Males ITT Females ATE Males ATE Females ITE Males ITE Females
 
Source: Own calculations based on program evaluation surveys 
Standard errors in parentheses.  
Bootstrapped errors obtained by CRVE-Block Bootstrap with 300 replications.  
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 4 
Program effects on agricultural employment, PRAF & RPS 
PRAF OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE
Baseline: Aug-Dec. 2000
t=1 (May-Aug. 2002) -0.028 -0.030 -0.030 -0.040 -0.036 0.010
Clustered (0.039) (0.039) (0.041) (0.043) (0.057) (0.047)
Boostrapped (0.038) (0.039) (0.042) (0.043) (0.058) (0.047)
Observations 8,158 7,931 6,451 6,257 1,707 1,674
Groups 5,034 3,746 1,289
RPS
Baseline: Aug-Sept. 2000
t=1 (Oct. 2001) -0.002 0.017 0.001 0.014 -0.004 0.041
Clustered (0.024) (0.020) (0.023) (0.020) (0.077) (0.078)
Boostrapped (0.023) (0.020) (0.023) (0.020) (0.077) (0.077)
t=2 (Oct. 2002) -0.013 0.016 -0.002 0.010 -0.037 0.083
Clustered (0.022) (0.019) (0.020) (0.019) (0.066) (0.063)
Boostrapped (0.022) (0.020) (0.019) (0.021) (0.069) (0.061)
Observations 6,438 6,464 5,484 5,505 954 959
Groups 2,903 2,239 664
DD Estimates
ITT ITT Males ITT Females
 
Source: Own calculations based on program evaluation surveys 
Standard errors in parentheses.  
Bootstrapped errors obtained by CRVE-Block Bootstrap with 300 replications.  
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 5 
Program effect on agricultural employment, PROGRESA 
PROGRESA
Baseline: Sept. 97-Mar. 98 OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE
t=1 (Nov. 98) -0.010 -0.007 -0.015 -0.010 -0.004 0.000 -0.014 -0.016 -0.029 -0.034 -0.017 -0.013 -0.058 -0.040 -0.012 -0.017 -0.006 -0.040
Clustered (0.012) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.016) (0.016) (0.012) (0.012) (0.035) (0.030) (0.013) (0.013) (0.046) (0.059) (0.018) (0.021) (0.037) (0.042)
Boostrapped (0.012) (0.010) (0.012) (0.011) (0.017) (0.016) (0.013) (0.012) (0.033) (0.029) (0.012) (0.014) (0.047) (0.059) (0.017) (0.020) (0.040) (0.039)
t=2 (Mar. 99) -0.007 -0.001 -0.009 -0.004 0.011 0.029 -0.011 -0.006 -0.024 -0.028 -0.016 -0.012 -0.046 -0.041 0.014 0.044 0.008 -0.034
Clustered (0.011) (0.010) (0.012) (0.011) (0.020) (0.020) (0.012) (0.013) (0.034) (0.032) (0.013) (0.013) (0.046) (0.059) (0.024) (0.026)* (0.039) (0.048)
Boostrapped (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.019) (0.020) (0.012) (0.012) (0.033) (0.031) (0.013) (0.014) (0.046) (0.061) (0.024) (0.028) (0.039) (0.049)
t=3 (Nov. 99) 0.004 0.003 0.006 0.001 0.004 0.019 0.019 0.006 -0.036 -0.027 0.020 -0.003 -0.051 -0.037 0.024 0.037 -0.027 -0.050
Clustered (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.020) (0.021) (0.013) (0.014) (0.034) (0.032) (0.013) (0.016) (0.047) (0.058) (0.023) (0.026) (0.038) (0.046)
Boostrapped (0.013) (0.010) (0.012) (0.012) (0.021) (0.021) (0.012) (0.014) (0.033) (0.031) (0.013) (0.016) (0.047) (0.060) (0.023) (0.028) (0.038) (0.046)
Observations 84,210 86,176 52,977 53,775 30,209 31,364 51,062 51,212 33,148 33,267 31,578 31,646 21,399 21,457 18,882 18,956 11,327 11,383
Groups 38,583 25,200 17,534 30,349 24,673 19,281 16,091 13,259 9,340
DD Estimates
ITT ATE ITE ITT Males ITT Females ATE Males ATE Females ITE Males ITE Females
 
Source: Own calculations based on program evaluation surveys 
Standard errors in parentheses.  
Bootstrapped errors obtained by CRVE-Block Bootstrap with 300 replications.  
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 6 
Program effects on individual hours of work, PRAF & RPS 
PRAF OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE
Baseline: Aug-Dec. 2000
t=1 (May-Aug. 2002) 0.681 0.814 0.493 0.580 1.840 1.849
Clustered (0.642) (0.650) (0.620) (0.617) (1.319) (1.716)
Boostrapped (0.657) (0.631) (0.569) (0.676) (1.400) (1.789)
Observations 8,139 7,913 6,438 6,245 1,701 1,668
Groups 5,029 3,745 1,285
RPS
Baseline: Aug-Sept. 2000
t=1 (Oct. 2001) -2.638 -2.982 -2.261 -2.667 -3.030 -4.067
Clustered (1.841) (1.807) (1.614) (1.649) (4.390) (4.734)
Boostrapped (1.830) (1.814) (1.609) (1.678) (4.416) (4.601)
t=2 (Oct. 2002) -1.996 -1.971 -1.475 -1.672 -5.668 -4.001
Clustered (1.884) (1.882) (1.792) (1.798) (4.039) (4.584)
Boostrapped (1.885) (1.890) (1.868) (1.869) (3.929) (4.584)
Observations 6,634 6,660 5,503 5,524 1,131 1,136
Groups 3,021 2,245 776
DD Estimates
ITT ITT Males ITT Females
 
Source: Own calculations based on program evaluation surveys 
Standard errors in parentheses.  
Bootstrapped errors obtained by CRVE-Block Bootstrap with 300 replications.  
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 7 
Program effect on individual hours of work, PROGRESA 
PROGRESA
Baseline: Sept. 97-Mar. 98 OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE
t=1 (Nov. 98) 0.616 0.648 0.834 0.521 0.285 0.648 0.659 1.100 0.686 1.203 0.608 0.708 2.144 0.407 0.708 1.196 -0.642 1.718
Clustered (0.578) (0.578) (0.684) (0.703) (0.670) (0.663) (0.607) (0.619)* (0.884) (1.500) (0.722) (0.733) (1.368) (2.497) (0.726) (0.775) (1.070) (2.035)
Boostrapped (0.572) (0.542) (0.704) (0.706) (0.671) (0.668) (0.614) (0.625)* (0.865) (1.584) (0.707) (0.805) (1.332) (2.671) (0.711) (0.755) (1.057) (2.006)
t=3 (Nov. 99) 0.085 0.258 0.173 0.010 -0.422 0.157 -0.172 0.178 0.457 1.061 -0.102 -0.395 1.418 -0.201 -0.688 -0.418 -0.450 2.849
Clustered (0.576) (0.566) (0.673) (0.719) (0.771) (0.802) (0.631) (0.640) (0.871) (1.486) (0.723) (0.793) (1.392) (2.503) (0.858) (1.016) (1.142) (2.151)
Boostrapped (0.560) (0.581) (0.729) (0.694) (0.797) (0.802) (0.675) (0.680) (0.859) (1.572) (0.714) (0.760) (1.401) (2.651) (0.853) (1.025) (1.154) (2.148)
Observations 78,020 79,832 43,996 44,720 33,138 34,216 50,373 50,483 27,647 27,742 27,888 27,933 16,108 16,150 22,007 22,066 11,131 11,180
Groups 41,799 24,959 20,653 33,227 23,661 18,848 13,977 16,184 10,029
DD Estimates
ITT ATE ITE ITT Males ITT Females ATE Males ATE Females ITE Males ITE Females
 
Source: Own calculations based on program evaluation surveys 
Standard errors in parentheses.  
Bootstrapped errors obtained by CRVE-Block Bootstrap with 300 replications.  
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 8 
Program effects on hours worked by adults in the household, PRAF & RPS 
PRAF OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE
Baseline: Aug-Dec. 2000
t=1 (May-Aug. 2002) 0.644 1.148 0.516 0.654 2.677 2.583
Clustered (1.567) (1.506) (1.719) (1.801) (3.436) (4.029)
Boostrapped (1.633) (1.468) (1.638) (1.817) (3.514) (4.174)
Observations 5,344 5,344 4,537 4,537 807 807
Groups 2,999 2,540 525
RPS
Baseline: Aug-Sept. 2000
t=1 (Oct. 2001) -4.444 -5.174 -3.447 -4.356 -12.338 -10.627
Clustered (2.911) (2.787)* (2.873) (2.861) (7.767) (8.151)
Boostrapped (2.977) (2.962)* (2.706) (2.606)* (7.308)* (7.974)
t=2 (Oct. 2002) -4.769 -6.380 -3.546 -5.211 -16.023 -14.832
Clustered (2.809)* (2.904)** (2.831) (2.899)* (6.267)** (6.896)**
Boostrapped (2.978) (2.831)** (2.687) (2.926)* (6.513)** (6.855)**
Observations 4,124 4,124 3,652 3,652 472 472
Groups 1,525 1,331 194
DD Estimates
ITT ITT Males ITT Females
 
Source: Own calculations based on program evaluation surveys 
Standard errors in parentheses.  
Bootstrapped errors obtained by CRVE-Block Bootstrap with 300 replications.  
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 9 
Program effect on hours worked by adults in the household, PROGRESA 
PROGRESA
Baseline: Sept. 97-Mar. 98 OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE
t=1 (Nov. 98) 0.218 0.744 0.285 0.490 -0.248 0.399 0.318 1.672 0.319 0.241 0.688 0.298 -0.976 -4.544 -0.076 2.566 1.158 4.588
Clustered (1.221) (1.221) (1.414) (1.404) (1.646) (1.675) (1.371) (1.475) (1.966) (3.130) (1.522) (1.560) (2.820) (4.616) (1.958) (2.246) (2.654) (4.475)
Boostrapped (1.204) (1.237) (1.484) (1.377) (1.660) (1.681) (1.441) (1.416) (2.045) (3.044) (1.532) (1.465) (2.849) (4.773) (1.899) (2.376) (2.489) (4.406)
t=3 (Nov. 99) -0.929 -0.549 -1.162 -0.946 -2.378 -0.770 -0.733 -0.406 -0.850 -1.722 -0.866 -0.883 -2.475 -8.076 -2.378 -1.798 -0.285 7.463
Clustered (1.220) (1.242) (1.457) (1.485) (2.056) (2.292) (1.299) (1.456) (1.981) (3.144) (1.526) (1.631) (2.770) (4.942) (2.375) (3.011) (3.433) (5.268)
Boostrapped (1.213) (1.241) (1.488) (1.444) (2.095) (2.375) (1.367) (1.415) (2.067) (3.189) (1.589) (1.627) (2.817) (5.021) (2.375) (3.071) (3.010) (5.091)
Observations 55,973 57,180 34,254 34,775 20,894 21,580 37,513 37,513 18,460 18,460 22,359 22,359 11,895 11,895 14,717 14,717 6,177 6,177
Groups 25,148 17,024 11,147 22,937 14,700 14,257 9,776 10,110 5,258
DD Estimates
ITT ATE ITE ITT Males ITT Females ATE Males ATE Females ITE Males ITE Females
 
Source: Own calculations based on program evaluation surveys 
Standard errors in parentheses.  
Bootstrapped errors obtained by CRVE-Block Bootstrap with 300 replications.  
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 10 
Program effect on individual log hourly wages, PROGRESA 
PROGRESA
Baseline: Sept. 97-Mar. 98 OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE
t=1 (Nov. 98) 0.011 0.015 -0.005 0.007 0.030 0.024 0.007 0.013 -0.024 -0.071 -0.002 0.007 -0.100 -0.034 0.020 0.030 0.036 -0.088
Clustered (0.032) (0.030) (0.040) (0.034) (0.036) (0.039) (0.031) (0.033) (0.088) (0.076) (0.037) (0.041) (0.161) (0.132) (0.039) (0.042) (0.073) (0.109)
Boostrapped (0.032) (0.029) (0.041) (0.033) (0.035) (0.037) (0.031) (0.033) (0.084) (0.077) (0.037) (0.040) (0.153) (0.130) (0.039) (0.042) (0.070) (0.109)
t=3 (Nov. 99) 0.051 0.057 0.050 0.069 0.052 0.036 0.057 0.065 0.001 -0.056 0.054 0.082 -0.052 0.008 0.062 0.056 0.026 -0.110
Clustered (0.033) (0.030)* (0.039) (0.035)** (0.039) (0.040) (0.031)* (0.034)* (0.090) (0.076) (0.034) (0.042)* (0.161) (0.136) (0.041) (0.053) (0.073) (0.114)
Boostrapped (0.036) (0.029)* (0.038) (0.035)** (0.041) (0.040) (0.030)* (0.033)** (0.086) (0.074) (0.036) (0.042)* (0.151) (0.133) (0.041) (0.055) (0.074) (0.117)
Observations 71,536 73,316 41,258 41,977 29,401 30,453 46,124 46,228 25,412 25,502 26,129 26,174 15,129 15,170 19,521 19,575 9,880 9,925
Groups 38,917 23,740 18,704 30,835 21,678 17,914 13,099 14,559 8,894
DD Estimates
ITT ATE ITE ITT Males ITT Females ATE Males ATE Females ITE Males ITE Females
 
Source: Own calculations based on program evaluation surveys 
Standard errors in parentheses.  
Bootstrapped errors obtained by CRVE-Block Bootstrap with 300 replications.  
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
Table 11 
Program effect on log household labor income per adult, PROGRESA 
PROGRESA
Baseline: Sept. 97-Mar. 98 OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE
t=1 (Nov. 98) 0.020 0.036 0.015 0.029 0.025 0.047 0.008 0.021 0.025 0.139 0.011 0.025 -0.014 0.077 0.009 0.015 0.077 0.176
Clustered (0.026) (0.025) (0.027) (0.027) (0.035) (0.035) (0.027) (0.029) (0.060) (0.077)* (0.028) (0.031) (0.081) (0.114) (0.040) (0.044) (0.081) (0.114)
Boostrapped (0.027) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.032) (0.034) (0.028) (0.030) (0.059) (0.078)* (0.027) (0.031) (0.081) (0.114) (0.039) (0.043) (0.081) (0.123)
t=2 (Mar. 99) 0.017 0.027 0.008 0.021 0.027 0.048 0.033 0.032 -0.009 0.108 0.028 0.038 -0.050 0.084 0.049 0.034 0.044 0.096
Clustered (0.027) (0.027) (0.030) (0.030) (0.039) (0.042) (0.029) (0.030) (0.061) (0.080) (0.032) (0.035) (0.084) (0.119) (0.047) (0.055) (0.083) (0.123)
Boostrapped (0.029) (0.027) (0.030) (0.029) (0.037) (0.039) (0.029) (0.031) (0.063) (0.084) (0.032) (0.035) (0.084) (0.116) (0.043) (0.058) (0.076) (0.135)
t=3 (Nov. 99) 0.053 0.068 0.051 0.074 0.044 0.048 0.057 0.068 0.045 0.139 0.055 0.071 0.011 0.116 0.030 0.016 0.099 0.132
Clustered (0.029)* (0.029)** (0.032) (0.032)** (0.044) (0.046) (0.030)* (0.032)** (0.061) (0.077)* (0.033)* (0.037)* (0.084) (0.117) (0.049) (0.059) (0.084) (0.120)
Boostrapped (0.032)* (0.031)** (0.029)* (0.031)** (0.042) (0.046) (0.030)* (0.030)** (0.059) (0.080)* (0.034) (0.036)** (0.085) (0.117) (0.048) (0.057) (0.079) (0.131)
Observations 66,209 67,369 43,591 44,114 21,713 22,350 42,194 42,194 24,015 24,015 26,903 26,903 16,688 16,688 14,766 14,766 6,947 6,947
Groups 24,865 17,502 10,762 22,539 16,584 14,933 11,766 9,618 5,419
DD Estimates
ITT ATE ITE ITT Males ITT Females ATE Males ATE Females ITE Males ITE Females
 
Source: Own calculations based on program evaluation surveys 
Standard errors in parentheses. Bootstrapped errors obtained by CRVE-Block Bootstrap with 300 replications. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Appendix: Brief description of the programs 
Mexico: PROGRESA Program 
In 1997, Mexico began implementing the first phase of the PROGRESA 
conditional cash transfer (later renamed Oportunidades) in rural areas. The program 
had a multi-sector focus, with intended impacts on education, health and nutrition, 
besides the potential for poverty alleviation from the cash transfer. 
The initial deployment of the program was designed to facilitate the evaluation 
of its impact. The program was geographically targeted by locality, based on a 
poverty index. From an initial group of 506 localities selected for the first round, 320 
were randomly selected to participate in the PROGRESA program (i.e., qualifying 
households in those localities would be eligible to participate), while the program was 
not deployed in the remaining 186 localities. Households in the latter localities were 
still subject to the data collection process, and thus constituted the control group for 
the program’s evaluation.16 Although the program was later expanded to cover 
additional areas, this document uses the initial 1997-1999 period.  
The data employed in this study originates in the PROGRESA Evaluation 
Survey (ENCEL-Encuesta de Evaluación de los Hogares). The estimates shown in 
the paper are based on the initial baseline survey, and three follow-up rounds 
implemented in the subsequent semesters after the program’s implementation. The 
surveys collected socio-demographic and labor market information at the household 
and individual levels for the treatment and control localities – in fact, the surveys 
interviewed all households in these localities.  
 
Honduras: PRAF Program 
 The Programa de Asignación Familiar (PRAF) was created by the 
Government of Honduras in the early 1990s as a compensatory mechanism to mitigate 
the impact of macroeconomic adjustments on the poor and alleviate structural 
poverty. Through several expansion phases, it reached a target population of 173,000 
households with children from 0 to 14 years old in 2008, and it constitutes one of the 
largest welfare programs in the country. The objective of the program is to encourage 
                                                 
16
 The evaluation followed a phase-in process: PROGRESA was deployed in the control localities 
when the program expanded its coverage in 2000. 
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poor households to invest in human capital –primarily education and health– through 
conditional cash transfers.  
This study concentrates on the second phase of the program (PRAF II), a 
reorganization of the original intervention planned in the late 1990s (Glewwe and 
Olinto, 2004). This PRAF II (PRAF for short)
17
 was implemented in 2000, and 
geographically targeted at the municipality level in the poorest region of the country 
(IFPRI, 2000). It was deployed in a set of 50 randomly selected municipalities of a 
total of 70, with the 20 additional municipalities forming the control group. While the 
experimental design of PROGRESA attempted to study the overall impact of the 
program, the PRAF design was more ambitious. The evaluation originally intended to 
contrast different types of interventions, and thus three sub-groups were created 
within the treatment group: (i) municipalities scheduled to receive a demand-side 
intervention (cash subsidies), (ii) those scheduled to receive a supply-side intervention 
(i.e., construction of schools and health centers), and (iii) a group that would receive 
both. The empirical results presented below are based on the control group and the 
municipalities in the first treatment sub-group, since the supply-side interventions 
were never implemented (Glewwe and Olinto, 2004) and there are a reduced number 
of municipalities in the combined intervention group.
18
 The number of municipalities 
used in the estimation is 40, with 20 in which eligible households could participate in 
PRAF and 20 in which the program was not deployed. 
The data in this document corresponds to a baseline survey carried out in the 
last quarter of 2000 and a follow-up survey in 2002, with a reasonably low sample 
attrition of approximately 8 percent. In contrast to the case of PROGRESA, where all 
households in treatment and control localities were interviewed, the PRAF surveys 
covered a sample of households. The corresponding sampling weights are used when 
possible in the empirical work below. 
 
Nicaragua: RPS Program 
The Red de Protección Social (RPS) conditional cash transfer program started 
in 2000. A first phase consisted of a three-year pilot in two rural areas of the central 
                                                 
17
 This phase was followed by a new one, which was implemented by the Government at the time that 
this report was prepared in 2008-2009. 
18
 For more on this, see Glewwe and Olinto (2004). 
 35 
region of Nicaragua (Madriz and Matagalpa), with poverty rates above the national 
average. The program was broadly modeled after PROGRESA, and its main objective 
was to improve households’ human capital through conditional cash transfers.  
The 42 localities (“comarcas”) with the lowest levels of a multidimensional 
marginality index within the intervention area were selected for the pilot. Half of 
those localities were randomly assigned to the treatment group, and the other half to 
the control group (Maluccio and Flores, 2005). The program was originally scheduled 
to be deployed in the control group localities after a year, but a series of delays meant 
that they were only incorporated two years later.  
The data used in this document corresponds to the initial baseline survey 
carried out in the third quarter of 2000, and the first follow-up survey conducted in 
2001. The sample attrition rate is approximately 7 percent. As with the PRAF 
evaluation data, the survey consists of a sample of the targeted population, and 
sampling weights are used when possible.  
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Appendix: Analysis of the random assignment 
process 
 
Tables A1-A3 present the results of a probit regression of the probability of 
being selected into the treatment sample for each program as a function of observable 
household and individual characteristics. Since the focus of this document is to 
estimate differentiated treatment effects across population subgroups, estimates are 
presented for the entire adult population aged 15-65, and separately by gender, with 
standard errors clustered at the locality level.
19
 The results reveal some significant 
differences between treatment and control groups in all three programs. 
The results from PRAF indicate that treatment and control localities varied in 
two important dimensions. Households in the treatment sample had a significantly 
higher proportion of children attending school, and a significantly lower proportion of 
children employed. There do not seem to be any significant differences by gender. 
In localities selected for PROGRESA deployment, there was a significantly 
higher proportion of individuals employed, and this effect was accounted for mainly 
by men. The treatment and control samples from RPS, according to the probit 
regression, seem to be more balanced. None of the included variables is significantly 
associated with the probability of participation in the program. 
 
                                                 
19
 A number of other models were estimated using further disaggregated characteristics. However, the 
results were qualitatively similar. Some of the differences disappear once the probit regression accounts 
for clustering at the locality level. 
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Table A1-Probit estimates for treatment (marginal effects), baseline year, PRAF 
Variable All Men Women
Age 0.0006 0.0011 0.0005
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Gender (1= Male, 0= Female) 0.0302
(0.028)
Number of children 0.0021 0.0001 0.0028
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Children employed -0.0865 -0.0930 -0.0813
(0.0270)*** (0.0297)*** (0.0284)***
Children attending school 0.1032 0.1249 0.0909
(0.0375)*** (0.0371)*** (0.0400)**
Literacy (1= Yes, 0= No) 0.0019 0.0372 -0.0216
(0.036) (0.034) (0.045)
Employed (1= Yes, 0= No) -0.0109 -0.0450 0.0427
(0.035) (0.046) (0.038)
Observations 6,897 2,868 4,029
LR Chi2 30.62 30.65 24.16  
Source: Own calculations based on program evaluation survey. 
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the locality level.  
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
Table A2-Probit estimates for treatment (marginal effects), baseline year, PROGRESA 
Variable All Men Women
Age -0.0001 0.0002 -0.0003
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Gender (1= Male, 0= Female) -0.0155
(0.011)
Number of children 0.0038 0.0050 0.0032
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Children employed -0.0113 -0.0192 -0.0067
(0.012) (0.013) (0.012)
Children attending school 0.0019 0.0039 -0.0001
(0.015) (0.016) (0.015)
Literacy (1= Yes, 0= No) -0.0178 -0.0089 -0.0266
(0.026) (0.029) (0.025)
Employed (1= Yes, 0= No) 0.0311 0.0443 0.0160
(0.0152)** (0.0216)** (0.016)
Observations 66,646 33,257 33,389
LR Chi2 9.63 8.71 2.48  
Source: Own calculations based on program evaluation survey. 
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the locality level. 
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
Table A3-Probit estimates for treatment (marginal effects), baseline year, RPS 
Variable All Men Women
Age -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Gender (1= Male, 0= Female) 0.0217
(0.028)
Number of children -0.0010 0.0008 -0.0029
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Children employed -0.0509 -0.0623 -0.0390
(0.038) (0.041) (0.038)
Children attending school 0.0349 0.0322 0.0388
(0.044) (0.044) (0.046)
Literacy (1= Yes, 0= No) 0.0152 0.0118 0.0191
(0.033) (0.043) (0.032)
Employed (1= Yes, 0= No) -0.0188 -0.0292 0.0068
(0.035) (0.046) (0.049)
Observations 4,674 2,290 2,384
LR Chi2 3.96 3.8 2.31  
Source: Own calculations based on program evaluation survey. 
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the locality level. 
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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